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Abstract
We propose that the rate of creation and failure of new ﬁrm start-ups
can be modelled as a search and matching process, as in labor market
matching models. Deriving an "entrepreneurial" Beveridge curve, we
show that a successful start-up depends on the eﬃciency with which en-
trepreneurial ability is matched with business opportunity, and outline
a number of possible applications of this matching approach to assist in
formalizing the economics of entrepreneurship.
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Although there are many deﬁnitions of entrepreneurship, most concur that en-
trepreneurship is about the discovery and exploitation of opportunities (Shane
and Venkataraman, 2000). How entrepreneurs perceive or discover opportuni-
ties, and utilize them to create new ﬁrms and businesses, has spawned a large
body of literature (e.g. Buenstorf, 2007; Casson and Wadeson, 2007; O’Fiet and
Patel, 2008, Plummer et al., 2007 and Ucbasaran et al. 2008).
A feature of the start-up process noted in this literature is that while there is
a large pool of latent entrepreneurs, many with highly developed human capital,
only a small proportion of them succeed in starting up a ﬁrm. While human
capital is not unimportant (e.g. Lazear, 2005), the likelihood and nature of
opportunities have also been identiﬁed as important inﬂuences on the rate of
start-ups (e.g. Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1998).
In this paper we take these two ideas — the human capital of prospective
entrepreneurs, and the chance and nature of opportunities — to propose a novel
way of understanding start-ups1. In particular, we borrow and adapt the con-
cept of labor market matching from the ﬁeld of labor economics, and apply it
to describe start-ups as the outcome of a match between entrepreneurs with ap-
propriate ability (human capital) and business opportunity. Common obstacles
to start-ups, such as insuﬃcient credit or misaligned regulations, can then be
seen as frictions in the matching process.
In this paper we outline the core of our idea. That is, we explain the essence
of start-ups as a matching process, and identify a number of research questions
that may emerge as avenues for further elaboration.
2 The Matching Approach
2.1 Intuitive Explanation
At any time in the economy there exist a number of opportunities for successful
start-up ﬁrms. These are constantly evolving, and may lead to both new ﬁrm
start-ups as well as ﬁrms market exits (churn). A useful way to model this
situation is the matching approach. It has been applied to various ﬁelds in
economics. Representative references for the labor market are Montgomery
(1991), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), and
Pissarides (2000).
With the matching approach we can address the problem of constantly evolv-
ing start-up opportunities, a high exit rate of new start-ups, and heterogeneous
business ideas (which are a requirement for innovation). Activities are described
by a failure of present activities, a search for new opportunities, and the match-
ing process that leads to new start-up ﬁrms. A match between start-up proﬁles
(reﬂecting entrepreneurial ability) and the requirements of the market will re-
sult in a start-up. Since the eﬃciency of this matching reﬂects the eﬃciency of
1This idea was ﬁrst proposed in a more rudimentary fashion by Gries and Naudé (2010a;
2010b). Here we elaborate the idea and propose its more general use in a variety of settings
in formalizing the role of the entrepreneur in economic theory.
1overcoming frictions and information and transaction costs, the eﬃciency of the
matching process also reﬂects the quality of the institutional framework in this
market.
2.2 Entrepreneurs
Our model distinguishes between active entrepreneurs,  and latent entrepre-
neurs . Entrepreneurs are the creators and subsequent owners and managers
of the ﬁrms in our model. In this sense our notion of entrepreneurs corresponds
to the deﬁnition of entrepreneurship as the ‘process of starting and continuing to
expand new businesses’ (Hart, 2003:5). As these ﬁrms come into being through
the spotting and utilization of opportunities, our notion is also consistent with
Shane and Venkataraman (2000)’s deﬁnition of entrepreneurship being about
the use of opportunities. A latent entrepreneur is a person who would pre-
fer to be an entrepreneur and who considers seeking, or is actively seeking, an
opportunity (Blanchﬂower et al. 2001). Around 25 percent of the labor force
in OECD countries have been found to be latent entrepreneurs (ibid. p.610).
Given entrepreneurs and latent entrepreneurs represent the total entrepreneurial
potential in the economy, , and can be written as  =  + .
2.3 Opportunities
Latent entrepreneurs search for opportunities to start up a new ﬁrm. We as-
sume that available opportunities are exogenously given - i.e. opportunities
exist independently of entrepreneurs. We denote the total number of potential
start-up opportunities by Ω.A t a n y t i m e , there are three types of start-up
opportunity. First, there are already taken opportunities, which have resulted
in a number of active entrepreneurs and their start-ups, . Second, there are
an u m b e r of unrealized proﬁtable opportunities ready for the taking by an
alert latent entrepreneur. And third, there are unrealised but idle (or yet un-
productive) opportunities available, denoted by . These may be temporary or
informal opportunities that are currently not proﬁtable. People are often forced
into these opportunities when they cannot obtain wage employment or spot a
proﬁtable opportunity as a result of either personal characteristics or external
economic conditions. The total number of opportunities for a start-up ﬁrm can
thus be written as
Ω =  +  + 
2.4 A Start-Up as a Match
As t a r t - u pﬁrm comes into being when the entrepreneur spots and utilizes an
opportunity that matches their abilities and "business plan." The number of
new start—up ﬁrms that result from such a matching is M per period. In aggre-
gate, this matching rate — or start-up rate — will be determined by three factors.
The ﬁrst is the environment for doing business in the country. This environ-
ment, including the institutional framework of the economy, will determine how
2eﬃcient the matching process is. For instance, an alert entrepreneur may spot
ap r o ﬁtable opportunity, but may be prevented for utilizing it (i.e. from being
"matched" to the opportunity). The overall matching eﬃciency in the economy
is denoted . The second determinant of the matching (start-up) rate is the ex-
tent of unrealized proﬁtable opportunities, denoted by .T h i sr e ﬂects the fact
that latent entrepreneurs are often said to be constrained by a lack of suitable
or proﬁtable opportunities. The third determinant of the matching (start-up)
rate is the capability of the entrepreneur, speciﬁcally on how intense the latent
entrepreneur may be searching for opportunities. We denote this search inten-
sity  of latent entrepreneurs  as aggregate . It has often been noted in
the literature that the keenness and eﬀort of latent entrepreneurs varies quite
considerably. Also, as we show in the next section, there are costs involved
in searching-the greater the search intensity, the higher the cost. Given these
determinants of the matching (start-up) rate we can assume that the matching
rate M can be written as:
M =  ()
where  denotes eﬀective search eﬀorts of entrepreneurs. Throughout the pa-
per, we will assume that the rate of matches per entrepreneur and the rate of
matches per opportunity depends on the ratio of opportunities to entrepreneurs
only, but not on the size of the economy. This implies linear homogeneity of
the matching function. In case of increasing or decreasing returns to scale in
matching, the eﬀectiveness of the matching process would vary according to the
size of the economy. Although this might be reasonable to some extent, we think
that this eﬀect should not be expected to be systematic. Rather it is due to
diﬀerences in the institutional and business environment of the economies, cap-
tured by diﬀerences in . Further, for computational simplicity we will model
the matching-function as a Cobb-Douglas function:
M =  ()
1− 
From this we can see that the probability of a successful new ﬁrm start-up is
 = .
2.5 Optimal Search and Investment Intensity, Matching,
and Firm Failure
At the individual level, any potential entrepreneur  will have to make some
search eﬀorts described by the intensity  to spot and seize up a start-up
opportunity. As we mentioned, such a search is costly. The search cost per unit
of search eﬀort is .
Existing entrepreneurs will have to invest a certain eﬀort  to ensure their
ﬁrm’s survival. The optimal search intensity to enter the market and the op-
timal investment intensity (eﬀort) to stay in the market will be the result of
maximizing entrepreneurs’ net present value.2 For simplicity we assume that
2We can also introduce unemployed persons searching for opportunities while still on wel-
fare beneﬁts, but for the sake of tractability we abstract from this possibility for now.
3entrepreneurs are identical and all entrepreneurial ventures yield the same ex-
pected proﬁt (net of wages). The optimization problem of a representative
entrepreneur needs to include two states: (i) the state of being a wage employed
latent entrepreneur searching for opportunities to start a business, and (ii) the
state of being an entrepreneur and trying to stay in business.
i) For the state of a wage employed latent entrepreneur, the net present
value of searching,  is given by wage income  minus search costs  times
search intensity plus the extra entrepreneurial income that can be expected if a
successful opportunity is found and realized as a proﬁtable new start-up ﬁrm. If
we take  as the value of entrepreneurial income then the extra entrepreneurial
income can be written on average as ∆ =  − . This extra entrepreneurial
income is not certain - the expected average extra income is ∆ weighted by
the probability of matching. In the previous subsection we established that
the probability of matching is . Since individual eﬀorts aﬀect the matching
probability  () for a given discount rate  we obtain
 =  −  +  ()∆
ii) For the state of an existing entrepreneur a c t i v e l yw o r k i n gt ok e e pt h eﬁrm
going, the net present value of being an active entrepreneur  is
 =  −  −  ()∆
Here the proﬁts are . In order to survive in the market, the entrepreneur
w o u l dn e e dt oi n v e s t with eﬀort . These required investments reﬂect the
transitory and dynamic nature of markets and existing institutional arrange-
ments for the ﬁrm. Despite such investments, a ﬁrm failure can still occur. We
denote the rate of ﬁrm failure by . From the perspective of the individual en-
trepreneur  their investment eﬀorts  may reduce the likelihood of ﬁrm failure
 which follows  = (),  :=   0,  := 2
2
  0.
The above implies that the entrepreneur has the choice to extend personal
eﬀort to enhance the probability of ﬁnding a match, and to lower the proba-
bility of ﬁrm failure. They can maximize the expected income in both states
of occupation, being a wage employed latent entrepreneur still searching for an
opportunity, or being an active entrepreneur trying to stay in business. Thus
the optimal search intensity, and the optimal eﬀort to make the investments




:  =  −  +  ()∆
max

:  =  −  −  ()∆
From the F.O.C. we obtain an optimal search eﬀort ∗ and optimal invest-
ment eﬀort 
∗ by using the implicit function theorem3
3See appendix 1.
4∗ = ∗ (∆ ) with
  0   0 ∆  0
  0   0

∗ = 
∗ (∆) with   0 ∆  0
2.6 Aggregate Equilibrium Outcome
Assuming identical behavior across entrepreneurs, we can now turn to consider
the implications for the economy’s aggregate equilibrium outcome.
First, we obtain the representative wealth diﬀerential ∆ of the two wealth
levels ( and  ) associated with being a latent entrepreneur (searching for
a start-up opportunity), or with being an active entrepreneur (trying to stay
in the market). Deﬁning the vector  =( ∆) we obtain an implicit
relation for this wealth diﬀerential:
∆ =
 −  + () − (∆)
 + ((∆)) + (())
(1)
This equation determines the wealth diﬀerential ∆ a st h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h e
net income diﬀerence of the two states. The discount factor equals the interest
rate  plus transition probabilities.
Second, we can consider diﬀerences in new ﬁrm start-ups and ﬁrm failures as
describing the market dynamics for ﬁrm creation and failure in the economy. In
the long-run stationary equilibrium the number of new ﬁrm start-ups will equal
the number of ﬁrm failures. Given the probability of ﬁrm failure discussed in
the previous subsection, the number of ﬁrm failures on the aggregate level is
. The number of matched new ﬁrm start-ups is equal to . Hence the
dynamics of ﬁrms is ˙  =  − . The associated stationary ﬂow equilibrium
condition is:
˙  =0 ⇔  =  (2)
Third, in order to determine the aggregate equilibrium number of start-ups
we also need to consider the dynamics of opportunities in the economy. We
suppose that these dynamics are captured by two probabilities denoted  and
.H e r e  denotes the probability that proﬁtable opportunities — either ﬁlled
or vacant — become unproﬁtable, while  denotes the probability of formerly
idle opportunities becoming proﬁtable. These probabilities may be determined
by exogenous changes including structural change, the rate and nature of eco-
nomic growth, political instability, and technological progress. Thus the dy-
namics (rate of change) in idle start-up opportunities is ˙  = ( + )−.T h e
associated stationary ﬂow equilibrium for opportunities is4
˙  =0 ⇔  =

 + 
Ω −  +  (3)
4We use the deﬁnition Ω =  +  +  to substitute for 
5With equation (1), (2) and (3) we obtain a system of three equations with
three endogenous variables (∆). The system is determined by informa-
tion, transactions costs, institutional features and general business environment.
These are reﬂected by the general matching eﬃciency  transaction costs  in
the start-up phase, and the adjustment costs  for ﬁrm growth and survival.
Furthermore the general business environment is reﬂected in the ability of mar-
kets to absorb new product variations Ω and the entrepreneurial potential of
the economy .
0= = (
∗)( − ) − (∗) stationary matching equilibrium
0= = ∆( + (
∗)+(∗)) −  + 
∗ +  − ∗ wealth diﬀ.
0= =  −

 + 
Ω +  −  supply of proﬁtable opportunities
From this system of equations we can derive Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The economy [the system of equations F, G, H ] has a station-
ary matching equlibrium solution of ﬁrm creation and ﬁrm failure, and
hence a stationary number of latent entrepreneurs ∗ unrealized but prof-
itable opportunities ∗ and a stationary diﬀerential of entrepreneurial and
labor wealth ∆∗,a sl o n ga s

+Ω − 0 → .
∗ = ∗ () ∗ = ∗ () ∆∗ = ∆∗ ()
where  =( Ω)
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Hence, proposition 1 states that we can ﬁnd a constant number of ﬁrms
in the economy. With a stationary number of ﬁrms we can identify to what
extent the opportunities of this economy or the entrepreurial potential could
be utilized. Further, we can also determine how high the stationary wealth
premium ∆∗ for a representative entrepreneur will eventually be. This kind of
information indicates the economy’s eﬃciency with respect to entrepreneurial
activities. In a perfect market economy without frictions all opportunities are
seized and there is little need for an extra premium to become an entrepreneur.
Therefore, we describe the market as a location (or institutional framework)
which may or may not be fulﬁlling its purpose eﬃciently.
3 Implications and Comparative Statics
The main aim of our paper is to present the novel idea of explaining ﬁrm crea-
tion and failure as the outcome of a matching process. While we largely leave
6elaborations and the application of the model to future research, we can illus-
trate how studying the comparative statics of the model can reveal the role of
the various determinants of ﬁrm creation and failure, and can point to some
policy recommendations that emerge from this matching approach. In particu-
lar, we are interested in the start-up rate as the percentage rate of new ﬁrms in
relation to presently existing ﬁrms , the survival rate as the percentage rate of
successful surviving ﬁrms in relation to presently existing ﬁrms , and the total
utilization of an economy’s entrepreneurial potential deﬁned as the percentage
rate of presently existing ﬁrms in relation to the total entrepreneurial potential
in the economy Ψ = 
. For these central indicators we determine the eﬀects
of a) the general market environment and the institutional quality indicated
by the matching eﬃciency parameter , b) information and transaction costs
during the start-up phase , and c) investment costs to keep the business in the
market . Finally we show that a growing economy promotes start-ups and ﬁrm
survival, and generally improves the utilization of an economy’s entrepreneurial
potential. We state these ideas in Propositions 2, 3 and 4. All eﬀects described
in these propositions are also illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
Proposition 2 An increasing matching eﬃciency,   0, will (i) increase the
matching and start-up rate in the economy  = M
 , (ii) decrease the rate
of ﬁrm survival  =1−  and, (iii) improve the total utilization of an
economy’s entrepreneurial potentials Ψ = 
,a sl o n ga s

+Ω−0 →











Proof: See Appendix 3.
The above proposition suggests the intuitively expected eﬀects. However, the
eﬀect 
  0 may require a short explanation. An increasing matching eﬃciency
in the start-up phase increases the proﬁtability of start-up eﬀorts. Therefore,
greater eﬀort is invested in this activity than in staying in business. As a result,
the start-up rate increases and the survival rate decreases.
Proposition 3 Increasing information and transaction costs when starting-up
  0, will (i) reduce the matching and the start-up rate , (ii) increase
the eﬀorts of staying in business and hence the rate of ﬁrm survival ,a n d
(iii) reduce the total utilization of an economy’s entrepreneurial potentials
Ψ As long as











Further, increasing investment costs for keeping the business in the market
  0 will (i) increase the eﬀorts of trying out a new business and the
7start-up rate ,( i i )r e d u c et h er a t eo fﬁrm survival , and (iii) reduce the










Proof: See Appendix 3.
While most of the eﬀects described in the proposition are intuitively clear, the
cross-eﬀects of the two kinds of cost require some explanation. If the transaction
costs of starting a new ﬁrm increase (  0) it will be relatively more attractive
to keep the business in the market, hence the relative eﬀort put into survival
increases and the survival rate rises. Symmetrically, if investment costs for
keeping the business in the market increase (  0), it becomes relatively
more attractive to potentially follow a new business idea and try something
new, rather than keeping the existing business in the market. Hence, less eﬀorts
are invested in business survival since new ideas can be tried easily. As a result,
the survival rate decreases and the start-up rate rises.
Proposition 4 A general economic expansion leading to a general increase in
opportunities Ω will (i) increase the matching and the start-up rate ,
(ii) decrease ﬁrm survival  and (iii) improve the total utilization of an
















Proof: See Appendix 4.
Figure 1 describes how the matching equilibrium can be endogenously deter-
mined. In ﬁgure 1 the entrepreneurial Beveridge curve describes the equilibrium
relation between unrealized proﬁtable opportunities and latent entrepreneurs
trying to match their idea to an opportunity. Hence this relation indicates
market eﬃciency in a potential equilibrium. For instance, an entrepreneurial
Beveridge curve located more in the North-West indicates ineﬃciency: Even if
there are a large numbers of unrealized proﬁtable opportunities, many latent en-
trepreneurs will still not be able to match their ideas to a proﬁtable opportunity.
Hence, if the curve was in the North-West would imply increasing ineﬃciency
due to strong frictions in information and transaction eﬃciency, or ineﬀective
institutions, or strongly diverging interests between customers and potential
entrepreneurs in the market. The slope of the entrepreneurial Beveridge curve
5This condition is a suﬃcient condition and states that the external market environment
must have a suﬃciently strong eﬀect on the probability of staying in business. That is, even if
an entrepreneur puts more eﬀort into staying in the market, this additional eﬀort has limited
eﬀects and will not strongly improve the chances of survival. This condition is also suﬃcient
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Figure 1: Entrepreneurial Beveridge curve and equlibrium start-up
describes how for given market conditions decreasing business opportunities
drive down the number of ﬁrms in the market  and/or drive up the number of
latent entrepreneurs  in the economy.
The second curve in ﬁgure 1 is the supply curve of proﬁtable opportunities.
This curve describes the relationship between latent entrepreneurs and the sup-
ply of proﬁtable opportunities for the given in- and outﬂo wc o n n e c t e dw i t ht h e
idle (or yet unproductive) opportunities . Equilibrium in the market occurs
where the Beveridge curve intersects the supply curve of proﬁtable opportuni-
ties. While ﬁgure 1 enables us to graphically illustrate the matching equilib-
rium and comparative static adjustments, we can also graphically illustrate how
changes in the market matching process aﬀect important economic indicators
like the utilization rate of entrepreneurial potential. For this purpose we can
draw a second axis starting at the given number of potential entrepreneurs .
This axis points to the opposite direction than the - a x i sb e c a u s ei tc o u n t st h e
number of active entrepreneurs. For a given  this axis hence also indicates the
utilization rate of the entrepreneurial capacity of this economy.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The purpose of this paper is to oﬀer a novel way of formalizing the processes of
ﬁrm creation and failure in an endogenous growth model setting. This is done
by considering successful start-ups as the result of a successful match between
entrepreneurs and opportunities. In this matching process, and the subsequent
survival of new start-ups, both entrepreneurial ability and search intensity and
investment eﬀort turn out to be signiﬁcant. However, even when individual en-
9trepreneurs raise their search intensity and investment eﬀorts, ﬁrm start-up and
failure rates will be aﬀected by institutions and the conditions for doing busi-
ness. Even though some entrepreneurs may overcome adverse conditions for
doing business, many others will not, and the aggregate utilization of entrepre-
neurial capacity in the economy will be lower. Using a few comparative statics,
we have illustrated how high costs of information and transaction, adjustment
and investment in a changing market environment and deteriorating conditions
for doing business will decrease the matching (start-up) rate and increase the
rate of ﬁrm failure. The policy implications are that measures to increase the
aggregate utilization of entrepreneurial capacity in the economy need to ad-
dress both the individual entrepreneurial level, as well as the aggregate business
environment.
If the creation and survival of new ﬁrm start-ups are an essential ingredi-
ent of economic growth and development process, then our approach oﬀers a
useful insight into the process underlying this churning of ﬁrms. Unlike other
approaches, where ﬁrm start-ups are a function of a myriad of often weakly
justiﬁed factors, factors that are treated separately from the determinants of
ﬁrm failure, the matching approach treats both the creation and the failure of
new start-ups essentially as a result of a mismatch between opportunities and
entrepreneurs - including their ability and external environment.
The model could be further elaborated to include the linkages between search
intensity and the degree to which entrepreneurship is valued in itself, as opposed
to merely being an instrument to achieve other outcomes. Future research could
investigate institutional entrepreneurship, that is to say, how individual search
eﬀorts could include eﬀorts to change the business environment. Finally, atten-
tion could also be given to considering how innovation and innovation policy
can assist in matching diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs to speciﬁc opportuni-
ties, and to gaining a better understanding of how investors and researchers
c a nb em a t c h e dt ov e n t u r ec a p i t a l i s t s . W eb e l i e v et h e s ea r ej u s taf e wo ft h e
potential areas where labor economics’ idea of matching can be applied to the
formalization of entrepreneurship in economic theory.
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5.1 Appendix 1: Determining Optimal Eﬀort Levels





















Optimal search eﬀort of each entrepreneur is determined by using the implicit
function theorem from the F.O.C. and S.O.C. We obtain
∗ = ∗ (∆ ) ∆  0   0   0   0   0
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Stay in market eﬀort: Determining optimal eﬀort to stay in the market,
eﬀort function  and derivatives:
max

:  =  −  −  ()∆
F.O.C. and S.O.C.
− − ∆ =0  −∆  0


















5.2 Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 1
Equations  [(1), (2), (3)] have continuous partial derivatives with respect
to all variables. As all variables are positive, and since

+Ω − 0 →
12 , the determinant of the Jacobian matrix for the smooth function ()=





































 | {z }
0
) 6=0
So that the Jacobian matrix is invertible and the implicit function theorem can
be applied. System [(1), (2), (3)] implicitly deﬁnes the functions
∗ = ∗ (Ω)
∗ = ∗ (Ω)
∆∗ = ∆∗ (Ω)
Comparative statics for the system F,G,H can be performed by taking the partial
































5.2.1 Discussion of the Beveridge Curve:
From the ﬁrst two rows of this system we obtain the entrepreneurial start-up
Beveridge curve. The start-up Beveridge curve is in analogy to the labor market
Beveridge curve.
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Slope of the Beveridge curve: 
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Location of the Beveridge curve: 
  
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solving for the four eﬀects of c, and Ω on the number of latent entrepreneurs
yields:










































































































































b) Eﬀects on the rate of utilization of entrepreneurial capacity:
 =  +  for  =1

























15c) Eﬀects on the separation rate and the survival rate:
 = (
∗ (∆∗ ())) with
  0   0
  0 ∆  0
From  we know that 
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